

COMMON CAUSE RESEARCH

Communicating bigger-than-self problems to extrinsically-oriented audiences.

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A report summarising the results of an interdisciplinary research project on expressions of social and environmental concern by people who attach greater than average importance to values of popularity, preserving public image, or wealth.

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Foreword

In September 2010, our five organisations jointly published *Common Cause: The Case for Working with our Cultural Values*. This report made the case that systemic and durable responses to the challenges that our organisations confront cannot be envisaged unless these come to be built upon an appeal to intrinsic values.

While *Common Cause* highlighted extensive empirical evidence from social psychology that intrinsic values are there to be engaged in us all, we wanted to demonstrate that this was the case through work with UK citizens discussing 'bigger-than-self' problems that are of importance to our respective organisations: climate change, the loss of the British countryside, child mortality in developing countries, and domestic child impoverishment. *Communicating Bigger-than-self Problems to Extrinsically-oriented Audiences* presents the results of such a study.

We demonstrate that a simple process of asking people for whom *extrinsic* values are of particular significance to reflect on the importance that they attach to *intrinsic* values can lead to marked changes in the way that these people subsequently talk about bigger-than-self problems. For example, once their intrinsic values are engaged in this way, people who are normally more extrinsically-oriented are more likely to voice concerns about equality and justice, the moral imperative to address bigger-than-self problems, or to express a feeling of responsibility to others. Conversely, these people are less likely to invoke self-interest or financial concerns.

These results, therefore, further underscore the possibility of communicating and campaigning in ways which – though tailored to particular audience segments – nonetheless aim to engage intrinsic values: values which are known to be of crucial importance in motivating sustained expressions of concern about social and environmental challenges. As such, this study points to new and exciting approaches to the design of campaigns and communications. We now invite others – academics, third sector communicators, and agency employees alike – to help us as we further develop and test such approaches.

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Summary and Practitioners' Guide

This report presents an overview of the results of research conducted with a pool of volunteers from Cardiff, Wales, for whom extrinsic (or more materialistic) values were held to be particularly important by comparison to the UK population at large. This research focused on the effects of asking participants in the study to reflect for a few minutes on why either intrinsic values ('acceptance', 'affiliation' or 'being broadminded') were of importance to them, or – in the case of a second group of participants - why extrinsic values ('popularity', 'preserving public image' or 'wealth') were important to them. Participants were then interviewed about a range of 'bigger-than-self' problems (including, for example, climate change and child poverty in the UK). These interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed.

Although all the participants in the study had been selected because they held extrinsic values to be more important, we found marked differences between, on the one hand, the way in which participants who had been asked to reflect upon extrinsic values spoke about bigger-than-self problems, and, on the other, the way in which participants who had been asked to reflect upon intrinsic values spoke about these problems. Compared to those primed with extrinsic values, participants primed with intrinsic values spoke about social and environmental challenges in ways that conveyed a stronger sense of moral duty, and a greater obligation to act to help meet these challenges.

These results should not be taken to suggest that asking participants to reflect on why particular values are of importance to them leads to a long-term, or 'dispositional', change in the values that these participants hold to be important. Our initial survey of participants' values provided a basis for us to select participants who all placed relatively high dispositional importance on extrinsic values. Such a disposition would have arisen as a result of accumulated experience, probably over many years, and is unlikely to be changed in a durable way as a result of briefly priming other values.

Rather, it seems that the differences we have identified between participants primed with intrinsic values and those primed with extrinsic values arose as a result of 'engaging' existing values – i.e., of turning certain values 'on' in people's minds, such that these values influenced how the participants conceived of the social and environmental challenges about which they were interviewed.

Clearly, individuals differ, dispositionally, in the values to which they attach particular importance. Unfortunately, however, this is sometimes taken to imply that it is futile to communicate with people who place particular dispositional importance on extrinsic values by appealing to intrinsic values. In fact, the results that we present here lend further support to the perspective that people hold a wide range of values, and that these can each be engaged.

Our results, then, have important implications for the design of third-sector campaigns and communications: in particular, the language and 'frames' that are used in such campaigns and communications.

Our **key recommendations** for campaigners and communicators are as follows:

- **Audiences who hold extrinsic values to be more important, at a dispositional level, can nonetheless be engaged in ways that lead them to express concerns consistent with intrinsic values.** The assertion, made by some campaign consultants and communication agencies, that it is futile to engage people who attach relatively greater importance to extrinsic values, using frames that embody intrinsic values, is not supported by the results of this research.
- **Activating intrinsic values leads an audience to express greater concern about 'bigger-than-self' problems.** Although it is not something that we tested in this study, there is extensive evidence – from a very large number of other studies – that intrinsic values also underpin greater motivation to behave in line with concern about such problems.

- **Activating intrinsic values leads to greater expressions of concern across a wide range of 'bigger-than-self' problems.** It is not necessary to engage values specifically associated with particular 'bigger-than-self' problems in order to generate heightened expressions of concern. Asking participants to think about why 'acceptance', 'affiliation' or 'being broadminded' was important to them led to heightened expressions of concern about a range of 'bigger-than-self' problems, and stronger perception of an obligation to act to help address these problems. Such results provide further evidence that any communicator – whatever the issues about which he or she is concerned – who engages intrinsic values in the course of interacting with his or her audience, is likely to increase this audience's motivation to express concern about a range of 'bigger-than-self' problems.

- **On the whole, campaigns and communications that serve – explicitly or otherwise – to prompt an audience to reflect on the importance that they attach to intrinsic values are likely to be more successful in prompting systemic concern about 'bigger-than-self' problems.** There is an important opportunity here for creative communicators and campaigners to develop approaches that prompt such reflection. Some of the third sector organisations that supported the present research are now beginning to work with communication agencies to develop such approaches.

- **These results invite careful reflection on the criteria used in audience segmentation techniques.** While we absolutely agree with the need to tailor a message to the intended audience, we have been highly critical of approaches which, following value surveys, have appealed to those audience segments who place greater relative importance on extrinsic values by framing communications and campaigns to appeal to these values. Nonetheless, values-orientation may of course be important as a basis for segmentation *prior to engaging intrinsic values*. But it may also be the case that other criteria, besides

values-orientation, are of far greater importance for the purposes of audience segmentation. For example, issues of national identity, regional language differences, educational attainment, or shared interests may provide a more relevant basis for choosing between possible frames to use in a particular campaign than values-orientation.

- **These results probably provide insights on what linguistic 'frames' are likely to engage intrinsic values.** Frames are used not just to express what is understood, but also to understand what is expressed. In light of this, presenting an audience with the frames that comparable individuals are found to consistently use when primed with intrinsic values holds promise for engaging these values. Elsewhere, we have advanced a detailed argument for the engagement and strengthening of intrinsic values as a basis for tackling 'bigger-than-self' problems (see valuesandframes.org). As we've seen, one response to the present study is to begin to develop communications and campaigns that prompt an audience to reflect on the importance that they attach to intrinsic values. But another is to use frames which, while more passively received, may nonetheless help to engage intrinsic values.

The research that we describe here, and the implications that we draw from this, focuses on language. However, it is important to note that this should not be seen to diminish the importance of other crucial aspects of people's lived experience when thinking about how third sector organisations communicate and campaign. A person's response to 'bigger-than-self' problems is likely to be shaped by many aspects of her cumulative experience – in both a short-term and a more dispositional way. Such responses are likely to be influenced, for example, by her educational experience, her experience at the work-place, and her experience of social institutions and public policies – to name just a few. While language may be one of the easier things for campaigners and communicators to change, it is not necessarily the most important.

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Abbreviations and Glossary

Bigger-than-self problems

These are problems such as climate change, or child impoverishment in the UK – i.e., problems that will be difficult to address through reliance upon expressions of self-interest. The 'return' (in cost-benefit terms) on an individual's personal effort to help address a bigger-than-self problem is unlikely to justify this expenditure of effort in helping to tackle the problem.

Cognitive frames

Our language is linked to the way that we think – as a result of our experience of the world and how we conceptualise it. In turn, our experience and conceptualisations are stored in structured forms in our long-term memory. These are called cognitive frames.

Priming

The process of temporarily engaging a particular idea or motivation in a person's mind.

Extrinsic values

Extrinsic values include those for conformity, image, social recognition, popularity, preservation of one's public image, wealth, financial success and authority. Throughout this report, we use 'extrinsic values' to denote both 'extrinsic goals' and 'self-enhancement values' – two discrete but related concepts in the social psychology literature.

Intrinsic values

Intrinsic values include those for self-acceptance, broadmindedness, affiliation, community feeling and social justice. Throughout this report, we use 'intrinsic values' to denote both 'intrinsic goals' and 'self-transcendence values' – two discrete but related concepts in the social psychology literature.

1. Introduction

Responses to bigger-than-self problems such as climate change, global poverty, child deprivation or loss of the British countryside currently fall far short of the breadth and depth of response necessary if these are to be adequately addressed.

A large and robust body of evidence from social psychology highlights the importance of cultural values in shaping our collective responses to challenges such as these. Extrinsic values (those which focus on social recognition and power, wealth, authority and preservation of one's public image) are associated with lower levels of concern about such problems and lower commitment to addressing them. Intrinsic values (including understanding, appreciation and tolerance for other people, unity with nature, concern about equality) are on the other hand associated with higher levels of concern about a wide range of bigger-than-self problems, and greater motivation to adopt behaviours in line such concern.

So, for example, people who prioritise intrinsic values are more likely to pursue various forms of civic engagement, to express concern about social justice, to engage in environmentally friendly behaviours, and to express lower levels of prejudice towards groups with which they do not themselves identify. In contrast, placing more importance on extrinsic values is generally associated with higher levels of prejudice, less concern about the environment, lower motivation to engage in environmentally-friendly behaviour, weak concern about human rights, more manipulative behaviour and less willingness to help others.¹

This body of evidence raises numerous important questions but in particular prompts careful reflection on the social influences that shape dominant cultural values. There are many such influences, including public policy, media, decision-making structures, and the form of social institutions. This study focuses on just

¹ See Holmes *et al.* (2011) for a summary of this evidence base.

one source of influence: the language that is used in public discourse when discussing social and environmental challenges. Although language is only one of many sources of influence it is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is particularly easy to change (unlike, for example, the way in which public institutions operate). Secondly, it is a source of influence that is particularly relevant to organisations – such as third-sector organisations – which invest considerable resources in communicating with public audiences.

Values are implicit in the way in which a communication is 'framed'. The language and metaphors that a communication deploys communicate a certain view of the world, and particular values will usually be integral to that view. Consequently, communications – whether produced by business, government, or non-governmental organisations – inescapably engage particular values, and the repeated engagement of particular values is likely to lead an audience to hold these values more strongly.²

Intrinsic values, then, are likely to be strengthened by communications that are framed in ways that create the impression that these values are desirable or that they reflect social norms. On the other hand, extrinsic values – which undermine people's motivation to address social and environmental problems – are likely to be strengthened by communications which are framed in ways that create the impression that these values are desirable or reflect social norms.

² This perspective has been disputed by some campaign consultants (though not, so far as we are aware, by research psychologists). Both Rose (2010) and Dade (undated) have argued that pursuit of behaviour in line with a particular value is likely to *diminish* the importance that a person attaches to this value. The authors of the present report, and of other recent reports, have argued that there is no theoretical or empirical evidence for this perspective (Crompton, 2010; Crompton & Kasser, 2009; Darton & Kirk, 2011; Holmes *et al.*, 2011), and neither Rose nor Dade have produced any such evidence. Indeed, a recent survey of social psychologists with expertise in behaviour, motivation and values, conducted by two of the authors of this report, failed to find an academic who agreed with the viewpoint advanced by Rose and Dade (Kasser & Crompton, 2011).

Of course, many campaigns are framed in ways that appeal to extrinsic values – they may highlight the economic self-interest of a particular developed country to assist in the development of poorer countries (because this could help to establish new export markets), or they may appeal to the economic competitiveness advantages of being a ‘first mover’ in investment in new green technologies (renewables, for example). Analogous appeals are used to attempt to motivate private-sphere behavioural choices. So, for example, many pro-environmental behaviours are promoted on the grounds that these save money or increase social status.

It is quite possible that campaigns framed in ways that appeal to extrinsic values could have a net negative impact, because such campaigns will probably serve to strengthen extrinsic values, thus outweighing the benefits that these campaigns may have in encouraging some people to adopt a particular socially – or environmentally – friendly behaviour, to donate to a charity, or to lend their support to a campaign. Such a possibility is particularly likely because, for every individual who is exposed to a campaign framed in terms of extrinsic values and who decides, as a result, to act in line with the campaign goals, there will be a large number of other people who will see the campaign material but will not be moved to act. Nonetheless, these people, too, are likely to have been influenced by the campaign materials in a way that increases their concern for extrinsic values, and therefore reduces their concern about social and environmental issues.³

Yet it has been argued by some campaign consultants that it is futile to communicate with people who attach particular importance to extrinsic values through the use of frames that embody intrinsic values.⁴

We have argued that this is not the case. Evidence accumulated across a large number of cultures shows that intrinsic values are held to be important, *even among those people who attach particular importance to extrinsic values*. It

³ For further reflection on this point, see Kasser & Crompton (2011)

⁴ Dade (undated); Rose (2010)

seems that everyone holds the full range of values to be important at different times, and even those people who attach particular importance to extrinsic values in a more consistent way still hold intrinsic values to be important.⁵

Moreover, the priority that people accord to particular values in the short-term, and indeed their more durable – or ‘dispositional’ – commitment to particular values, changes over time. In the short-term, even over the course of a day, a wide range of different values may be engaged. The values that are engaged while at the supermarket are likely to be different to those values engaged while sitting around the dinner table with one’s family. But people’s values are also known to change at a dispositional level over longer periods of time.⁶

So we are critical of communication and campaign strategies that apportion people to particular values ‘modes’, and that then advocate engaging these audience segments through appeal to these ‘modes’ – irrespective of whether these are values that are socially and environmentally helpful.

Nonetheless, audience segmentation approaches of the type that we criticize do convey at least one important insight, assimilated from commercial marketing campaigns: not all audiences are the same, and it is important to communicate with different audiences in ways that respond to these differences.

So we are now led to two important conclusions:

1. It is important to tailor communications and campaigns in awareness of the audience at which these are targeted.
2. It is important to communicate in ways that successfully avoid engaging (and therefore strengthening) extrinsic values, because these oppose the emergence of greater social and environmental concern about bigger-than-self problems.

⁵ Schwartz (1992)

⁶ Bardi (2009)

The research described in this paper sets about exploring these two conclusions. In developing this exploration, two questions are posed:

1. Can we demonstrate the possibility of engaging intrinsic values among audiences who attach greater than average importance to extrinsic values, in such a way that the engagement of these intrinsic values is recognisable when these people are subsequently asked to talk about bigger-than-self problems such as climate change or child mortality in developing countries?
2. Can we begin to identify particular cognitive frames that audiences who attach greater than average importance to extrinsic values themselves use, in talking about bigger-than-self problems, when they have undergone a process to engage intrinsic values? If we can, then it may be that in future communications about these problems, such frames will help to engage intrinsic values in new audiences who attach greater than average importance to extrinsic values.

2. Method

2.1. Brief overview

In the first phase of this study, we screened a large pool of volunteers for individuals who attached the greatest importance to extrinsic values. We then split these individuals into two groups. We 'primed' one group with intrinsic values, and the other group with extrinsic values, following a standard procedure used in other published experiments of this type. This 'priming' process leads to an engagement of either intrinsic or extrinsic values in participants' minds. We then interviewed each of these participants about climate change, the loss of the British countryside, child mortality in developing countries and child impoverishment in the UK. We transcribed audio recordings of these interviews – which lasted up to an hour, and then analysed these transcripts employing both a computer programme, and an expert analyst. The discourse analyst who conducted this analysis (Professor Paul Chilton) was 'naïve' both to the specific prime that each participant had been given, and even to the *type* of priming conditions that we had used. (In other words, when he was presented with the transcript of each interview, he had no way of knowing the priming condition to which each participant had been exposed.)

We then looked for statistically significant differences between the cognitive frames used by participants to talk about each of the 'bigger than self' problems, depending upon whether we had primed them with extrinsic or intrinsic values. Each of the steps in this experimental procedure is outlined in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Schematic representation of stages in this study

In the second phase of this study, further in-depth discourse analysis was conducted on a subset of participants drawn from both priming conditions. At this stage, however, analyst was no longer naïve to the priming condition used with each participant, and thus might have been biased in certain ways.

Readers who are not concerned with the background details of this methodology can now skip to Section 3. The remainder of this section outlines the methodology of our study in a little more depth. For an even more in-depth account of this methodology, readers are referred to a comprehensive research report, to be published separately.

2.2. Selecting participants for the study

We wanted to work with audience segments who attach greater than average importance to extrinsic values. With this in mind, we conducted a pre-screen on a large pool of volunteers to identify those who were in the top 10% in attaching importance to extrinsic values.

Participants in this study were initially recruited via an e-mail invitation to take part in a brief survey. 774 participants responded to this e-mail, including 536 from a Cardiff University pool, and 238 from a community participant panel.

Participants were asked to rank a range of values in terms of their importance as guiding principles in their lives. These values were a subset of those measured in the Schwartz Value Survey, including five self-enhancement values (being ambitious, being successful, possessing wealth, social power, and authority), four self-transcendent values (equality, being helpful, unity with nature, and a world at peace), three openness values (a varied life, being curious, freedom), one conservation value (respect for tradition), and one hedonism value (pleasure). Because we were primarily interested in finding individuals who placed a high priority on self-enhancement values, the measure contained a larger proportion of these values than the others.

We rank-ordered participants' scores on extrinsic values from highest to lowest, and identified the participants whose mean extrinsic scores placed them in the top 10 percent of the sample (there were 77 of these participants). We invited these individuals via email to participate in a second study, for which we provided a small financial incentive. Our final sample of 30 participants included 17 women and 13 men, with an average age of 41.

Although our participants were all drawn from the top 10% of this large pool of people, ranked according to the importance that they attached to extrinsic values, we still wanted to check that these people were significantly oriented to extrinsic values by comparison to the population at large. To assess this, we compared our participants' scores with data on UK values collected by the European Social Survey.⁷ We found that our participants did indeed demonstrate a significantly stronger attachment to extrinsic values than the UK-wide sample. However, our participants were not significantly less intrinsically-orientated than the UK average although the trend was in the direction that would be predicted from Schwartz's circular model of values (i.e., an increase in extrinsic values did indeed predict a decrease in intrinsic values).

2.3. Priming and interviews

Participants arrived at the laboratory individually and underwent the priming manipulation. This procedure entailed randomly assigning participants to complete a task in which they reflected carefully on either extrinsic or intrinsic values: participants were asked to spend 10 minutes writing reasons for considering three values to be important.⁸ Half were assigned to write about three extrinsic values, the other half to write about intrinsic values. The values selected for the extrinsic prime were *popularity*, *preserving public image*, and *wealth*; the values for the intrinsic prime condition were *acceptance*, *affiliation*, and *being broadminded*. It is important to note that the values used in the intrinsic prime condition did not relate directly to humanitarian or environmental concerns. We expected that engagement of these values would nonetheless

⁷ ESS (2002).

⁸ This procedure was based on Maio *et al.* (2001).

affect how people talked about humanitarian and ecological topics, given the large body of research demonstrating a type of 'bleed-over' between compatible values, such that engaging one type of intrinsic value is likely to engage other values in the intrinsic group. An example of the priming process is shown in Figure 2. This has been transcribed from longhand, to preserve the anonymity of the participant.

Below are some values. In the space provided next to the values, please write down reasons why you think the value in question is important.

Why do you think **acceptance** is important?

Acceptance is important to improve self-confidence and to receive gratification of what you are doing as a person is right.

It is also very important to be accepted if you are 'different' i.e. have a disability, in order to become an equal part of society.

Why do you think **affiliation** is important?

Affiliation is important to create a sense of community and be around people who have similar interests and/or beliefs as you.

Why do you think **being broadminded** is important?

It is important to be broadminded in order to gain a fuller, more rounded experience of life.

Figure 2: An example of one participant's response to the priming questions.

Immediately following the priming procedure, participants began a semi-structured interview, which was conducted in two stages. Although, in interviewing participants, the interviewer was not naïve to priming condition, this was not considered significant in the light of the use of a standardised participant-led approach to conducting the interviews. In each stage, participants were asked questions about four topics in the following order: climate change, the loss of British countryside, child mortality in developing countries, and child impoverishment in the UK. In the first stage, participants answered three questions about each topic. For example, in the case of the climate change topic, they were asked:

- What are your general thoughts about climate change?
- What are some of the reasons why climate change is either important or unimportant?
- Emotionally speaking, how does climate change make you feel?

After answering comparable questions about the three other topics, the second stage of the interview commenced, during which two more questions were asked about each topic, in order. Below are the two questions, again worded for the topic of climate change:

- What actions, if any, do you think that you should take to help with climate change?
- What other actions, if any, should Government, businesses, and communities take to help with climate change?

Following the interview, participants completed a personal value questionnaire⁹ to check whether participants' values had changed as a result of the priming manipulation. Participants were asked to read brief paragraphs describing a person's behaviour, and, for each paragraph, rate how similar they were to the person, using a 6-point scale from 1 (*very much like me*) to 6 (*not like me at all*). Each paragraph was relevant to one of the core values described by Schwartz.¹⁰

⁹ Schwartz *et al.* (2001)

¹⁰ Schwartz (1992)

For instance, the value of creativity was described as follows: "Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way."

2.4 Linguistic analysis

Audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed and analysed using a computer program. We used five variables based on semantic categories in a computer program called Wmatrix: helping words (e.g. *help, support, aid*); words concerning distance (e.g., *near, far*), emotional actions, states & processes (e.g. *love, worried, appalled*); 1st person singular pronouns (*I, me, my, mine, myself*) and 1st person plural pronouns (*we, us, our, ours, ourselves*); and deontic words (that is, words relating to duty or obligation) (e.g., *should, ought, duty to*). The computer program calculates the relative frequencies of each of these word categories for each transcript, providing the relative frequencies of each semantic category for each participant.

Separately from this computerized approach interviews were also analysed by an experienced linguist (Paul Chilton). It should be reiterated that, **in Phase 1 of this analysis the linguist was naive both to the nature of the priming process, and to the priming condition to which each participant belonged.** For each of the four topics, Chilton focused on five variables: value orientation, immediacy, scope of moral duty, action obligations, and emotional intensity. Table 1 provides definitions and the basic scoring template for each of these variables.

Variable	Definition	Scoring
Value Orientation	Extent to which extrinsic vs. intrinsic values express themselves when participants discuss the topics.	1 - predominantly extrinsic 2 - mixed/analyst uncertain 3 - predominantly intrinsic
Action Obligation	Extent to which participants believe there is an obligation to act to solve the problem.	1- no one should act (help) 2- uncertain/unclear/absence of strong obligation/self has no need or duty to act 3 - self/individuals/other agency should act
Scope of Moral Duty	The particular people or things towards whom or towards which participants expressed moral duty; this could range from self, to close family, to kin, to compatriots, to all humans, to all life.	1 - self interests/vague <i>we</i> or <i>you</i> /none 2 - home/UK/mixed focus 3 - global human/animal/environment interests
Expressed Emotional Intensity	Presence of strong emotions when participants discuss the topic.	1 - low level 2 - moderate/non-committal 3 - high level
Immediacy	How much the participants feel the topic is close in time and space to them.	1 - distant/low impact/salience/no 2 - moderate/unclear/no concern 3 - close/high impact/salience

Table 1 – Overview of linguist's qualitative ratings from the interviews

In Phase 2 the linguist conducted further analysis on a subset of the interview transcripts. We chose 14 participants for further analysis: 7 participants from the group primed with intrinsic values and 7 participants from the group primed with extrinsic values. These individuals were chosen on the basis that they appeared to have responded most strongly to the priming procedure across a variety of variables, and on topics for which we found significant or close-to-significant effects.¹¹

Transcripts from interviews with these 14 participants were subjected to detailed linguistic analysis. Phase 2 generated results that are of great importance, but – because the analyst was aware of the priming condition in analyzing them at this stage – they are very different from those generated in Phase 1. Further, it is of course possible that bias may have entered the analysis during this second phase, and so the results may need to be treated with greater caution. For this reason, examples of such analysis are reported in a separate section (Section 5).

¹¹ These individuals were chosen as follows: we examined the effects of the priming conditions on each of the five variables listed in Table 1, for each of the interview topics. For example, we examined the effect of the prime for each participant's expression of moral duty in talking about loss of the British countryside. In seven cases, these effects were significant or marginally significant. We then looked at the scores (1-3) that the analyst had awarded each participant, for each of these seven variable/topic combinations. We summed these scores for each participant, which could theoretically vary in the range 7-21. We then selected the seven participants with the highest scores, and the seven with the lowest.

3. Results of Phase 1

In this section we report on the results of this study at two levels:

1. Computer analysis of the interview transcripts
2. Analysis by a discourse analyst (while still naïve to primes)

Results for these stages are presented in subsections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.

3.1. Computer analysis

In the first instance, it was thought useful to adopt a computerized analysis. We used the software tool Wmatrix, because it is designed to categorise word meanings. We wanted to see if Wmatrix detected differences between the types of words used by participants depending upon whether they had been primed with extrinsic or intrinsic values. We found no statistically significant differences, for the two priming conditions, in the relative frequency of words belonging to four of the five semantic categories that Wmatrix looked at (namely, deontic words, helping words, distance words, emotional words). This may be because interviewees were all talking about the same topics and responding to the same questions. It is likely that a more fine-grained analysis is required than the computerized word-counting can provide. However, the use of first-person pronouns did differ significantly. Participants primed with extrinsic values used significantly fewer 1st person singular pronouns (*I, me, my, mine myself*) than did participants primed with intrinsic values. Differences in the use of the 1st person plural pronouns (*we, us, our, ours, ourselves*) approached significance, such that participants in the extrinsic-prime condition used fewer 1st person plural pronouns than those in the intrinsic-prime condition. We comment further on these results in Section 4.1

The difficulty of identifying effects using computer programs is a well-known problem in linguistic analysis. After all, people using the same set of words might combine them in different ways, producing entirely different meanings and attitudes. By contrast, a human analyst is able to identify points at which, for

example, moral frames are used, even though no – or very few – deontic words are spoken. For this reason, the subsequent analysis by a discourse analyst (naïve to priming condition) was considered essential.

3.2. Initial analysis by discourse analyst

For each of Chilton's non-computerised ratings described in Table 1 (i.e., Value Orientation, Action Obligation, Scope of Moral Duty, Expressed Emotional Intensity, and Immediacy), we conducted a statistical analysis to examine:

1. Whether the rating varied depending on the type of values that had been primed (i.e., intrinsic or extrinsic values)
2. Whether the rating varied depending on the topic participants were discussing (i.e., climate change, loss of British countryside, child mortality in developing countries, and child impoverishment in the UK)
3. Whether these two factors interacted (i.e., whether the prime had an effect for certain topics, but not others).

Results of these three statistical analyses are presented in the following sub-sections, for each of the quantitative ratings listed in Table 1. These results are summarised in Table 2. Again, remember that, although the analysis itself has an important subjective component, at this stage the analyst did not know which priming condition each of the participants had undergone.

3.2.1 Value Orientation

The analyst scored each participant on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 was predominantly extrinsically-oriented, 2 was mixed or unclear, and 3 was predominantly intrinsically-oriented (see Table 1). This score was awarded for each of the four topics (climate change, the loss of the British countryside, child mortality in developing countries and child impoverishment in the UK). Statistical analysis revealed a significant effect of the priming condition such that participants expressed a greater orientation towards intrinsic values in the intrinsic-prime condition than in the extrinsic-prime condition.

We did not find any significant effect arising from the topic discussed. Nor did we find any significant interaction between the topic and the priming condition.

3.2.2 Action Obligation

Next, we tested the extent to which participants expressed the belief that there was an obligation for some person or agency to act to address the topics about which they were interviewed. Transcripts were scored as outlined in Table 1. Again, we found that the priming condition had a significant effect. Participants primed with intrinsic values expressed higher Action Obligation than did those primed with extrinsic values. Action Obligation also differed depending on the topic. Loss of British countryside elicited significantly lower action obligation than climate change. The interaction between prime and the topic was not significant, however.

3.2.3 Scope of Moral Duty

To whom or to what might participants feel they had an obligation? It might be to the self, the national community or to humans in general. Analysis examining how far participants' expression of moral duty extended beyond duty to self again revealed a significant effect of the priming condition. Participants primed with intrinsic values reflected a less self-interested and more universalistic concern for others than did those primed with extrinsic values. Scope of Moral Duty was found to vary with topic, however. Specifically, loss of British countryside evoked significantly lower reference to moral duty than did the topics of climate change, child mortality in developing countries, or child impoverishment in the UK. There were no significant differences among these latter three topics. The interaction between topic and priming condition was not significant.

3.2.4 Immediacy

It might have been the case that the different topics felt more salient, or 'closer', to some participants, and less so for others. Although the trend was

found to be in the expected direction (for example, CIUK was found to be more immediate than CMDC or protecting the British countryside), this was just short of significance.

3.2.5 Expressed Emotional Intensity

Analysis of variance in emotional intensity revealed no significant effect of the priming condition, but there was a significant effect of topic. The topic of child mortality evoked significantly more emotion than the topic of climate change or loss of British countryside. No other effects were significant.

Variable	Analyst's rating varies significantly with priming condition?	Topic-specific effect?
Value Orientation	Yes: significantly higher intrinsic orientation in participants primed for intrinsic values.	No
Action Obligation	Yes: significantly higher Action Obligation in participants primed for intrinsic values.	Yes: loss of British countryside elicited significantly lower Action Obligation than did climate change.
Scope of Moral Duty	Yes: less self-interested concern among participants primed for intrinsic values.	Yes: loss of British countryside evoked lower reference to moral duties than did climate change, child mortality in developing countries, and child impoverishment in the UK.
Immediacy	No	No
Expressed Emotional Intensity	No	Yes: child mortality evoked significantly more emotion than did climate change or loss of British countryside.

Table 2 – Results of preliminary analysis (analyst naive to priming condition). No significant interaction was found between topic and priming condition for any variable.

3.3. Post-manipulation value importance

In past research, effects such as those reported above were found to occur independently of any *change* in a person's values as a result of the priming process. Rather, it seems that such effects are attributable to the *engagement* of particular values as a result of the priming process. Collection of post-interview data allowed us to examine whether this was the case in our study. We compared the results of our survey of participants' values, using the second value survey - conducted after the interview.

The only significant difference occurred for the value of Tradition. Here, participants primed with intrinsic values reported this value to be more descriptive of themselves than did participants in the extrinsic-prime condition. This unexpected difference does not appear to have any direct bearing on our principal findings.

4. Discussion of Phase 1

4.1. Overview of findings

This research led to an important result. We found that a simple procedure to prime intrinsic values (among an audience segment who attaches relatively greater importance to extrinsic values than does the UK population at large) leads these individuals to express significantly different frames than those expressed by individuals primed with extrinsic values, when both sets of individuals were talking about a range of social and environmental challenges.

It is worth emphasising here that this result should not be taken to suggest that the values which individuals hold to be important at a more permanent, or 'dispositional' level are easily malleable. The participants in this study all placed relatively high dispositional importance on extrinsic values. Such a value disposition would have arisen as a result of accumulated experience, probably over many years. Such experiences would be likely to include the way in which these individuals were parented and educated, their interactions with work colleagues and family, and their exposure to the media and advertising. Our procedure for priming either intrinsic or extrinsic values was not found to affect the dispositional importance these participants placed on particular values (see Section 3.3).¹² It seems that the differences we identified between participants with intrinsic and extrinsic values arose as a result of 'engaging' existing values – i.e., of turning certain values 'on' in people's minds, such that these values influenced how the participants conceived of the social and environmental challenges about which they were interviewed. Such a result therefore corroborates the perspective that, far from being able to neatly assign people to different values 'modes', people actually have the full range of values present in their motivational systems, and these values can be engaged as to influence later expressed attitudes. The important issue is which of these values are engaged at any particular time, as a result of an experience or message.

¹² There was one exception to this, as discussed in Section 3.3: Participants' rating of the importance of Tradition.

Significant differences, with priming condition, were found both in our computer analysis and discourse analysis, the latter being particularly revealing.

In the case of the computer analysis, participants primed with extrinsic values used significantly fewer 1st person singular pronouns (*I, me, my, mine, myself*) than did participants primed with intrinsic values. This may at first appear counterintuitive, since it could be expected that extrinsic-primed individuals would make more reference to self. However, use of the first person singular need not reflect selfishness, as intrinsic values include those for self-acceptance, and intrinsic values are associated with values of self-direction. It may have been that participants primed with intrinsic values are prompted to think more about themselves and their identities as they grappled with the social and environmental problems about which they were interviewed.

Differences in the use of the 1st person plural pronouns (*we, us, our, ours, ourselves*) approached significance. It seems that the intrinsic value priming condition may have led participants to talk in ways that reflect higher relational content. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the engagement of other intrinsic values such as benevolence, affiliation, community and universalism.

Explaining these differences has to be speculative. Maybe extrinsic-primed individuals use 1st person singular pronouns less frequently because they are less personally engaged or because they tend to objectify the world rather than see it in terms of personal relations (something that pronouns encode). Maybe they use fewer 1st person plural pronouns because they think less about group membership, whether that group is local community, national community or humanity in general.

In the case of the initial analysis by the discourse analyst (who was at this stage naïve to the priming condition), we found differences across the priming conditions for three of the five variables examined. Compared to those primed with extrinsic values, participants primed with intrinsic values: spoke about

social and environmental challenges using more intrinsically-oriented than extrinsically-oriented language; suggested a greater obligation on the part of people to act in order to address the problem; and suggested a greater moral duty to address the problem. That is, we found significant variation, with value prime, in Value Orientation, Action Obligation, and Moral Duty. Not surprisingly, we did not find any effects of value prime on either the Expressed Emotion Intensity or Immediacy variables. This makes sense given that participants primed with extrinsic values might be anticipated to be as emotionally engaged by the issues about which they were interviewed as participants primed with intrinsic values, although the emotions might be rather different or differently expressed. Similarly, participants primed with extrinsic values might feel that the topics about which they were being interviewed were quite immediate, even though that sense of immediacy may occur because of a sense that the problems impinge on their own lives (for example, expressing a sentiment that measures designed to help reduce climate change impinge on their freedoms to behave as they would like).

4.2 Specific implications

There are at least five possible implications these results, all of which are of importance to anyone working to build audience concern about bigger-than-self problems.

Implication 1: Audiences oriented towards extrinsic values can be primed to express concerns consistent with intrinsic values

Overall, the results demonstrate the relative ease with which individuals who prioritise extrinsic values can be primed in such a way that they talk about social and environmental problems using frames that embody intrinsic values. The assertion, made by some campaign consultants and communication agencies that it is futile to communicate with people who attach relatively greater importance to extrinsic values using frames that embody intrinsic values is not

supported by the results of this research. We reflect on possible approaches to priming intrinsic values in 'real life' communications in Section 6.

Implication 2: Priming intrinsic values in audiences oriented toward extrinsic values leads to greater expression of concern about a range of social and environmental issues.

This study offers further corroboration for the perspective that interventions which successfully engage intrinsic values are likely to lead to heightened expressions of concern about bigger-than-self problems. Other work has also demonstrated that the engagement of intrinsic values is associated with greater motivation to behave in ways consistent with this concern.¹³ The present study examined expressions of concern, rather than motivation to engage in pro-environmental and pro-social behaviours. But we predict that an priming with intrinsic values will also lead to transient increases in such behaviour.

Implication 3: It is not necessary to prime values specifically associated with particular social or environmental concerns in order to generate expressions of concern. Priming other intrinsic values elicits these expressions of concern.

It is important to note that, during the priming process, we did not ask participants to reflect on intrinsic values that were directly related to social or environmental problems. 'Acceptance', 'affiliation' and 'being broadminded' are not, at first glance, directly related to concern for the environment or impoverished people in the UK or elsewhere. Yet, as predicted from an understanding of the dynamic way in which values interact with one another, it seems that there was 'bleed-over' such that participants for whom these values were primed were also more likely to express heightened concern about a range of issues closely related to the values 'unity with nature', 'protecting the environment', and 'social justice'. Such results provide further evidence that any communicator – whatever the issues about which he or she is concerned – who

¹³ See *op. cit.* 1 for references.

primes intrinsic values in the course of interacting with his or her audience, is likely to increase this audience's motivation to express concern about a range of social and environment issues, and to behave in line with that heightened concern. This is the premise upon which the Common Cause approach is built. There is already very extensive empirical evidence for this effect: this present study offers further corroboration.¹⁴

This finding also points to the possible advantages of campaigns and communications that serve – explicitly or otherwise – to prompt an audience to reflect on the importance that they attach to intrinsic values. There is an important opportunity here for creative communicators and campaigners to develop approaches that prompt such reflection.

Implication 4: These results invite careful reflection on the criteria used in audience segmentation techniques

These results raise questions about the optimal approaches to audience segmentation in designing social marketing interventions. Communicators and campaigners often segment their audiences, and engage different audience segments in different ways. Such segmentation might be conducted on the basis of socio-economic parameters, expressions of concern about environmental or social issues, or value surveys, for example.

While we absolutely agree with the need to tailor a message to the intended audience, we have been highly critical of approaches which, following value surveys, have appealed to those audience segments who place greater relative importance on extrinsic values by framing communications and campaigns to appeal to extrinsic values.¹⁵ As we have seen, the present study corroborates our case that campaigners and communicators should seek to avoid use of frames which are likely to engage extrinsic values.

¹⁴ See *op. cit.* 1 for references.

¹⁵ Kasser & Crompton (2011).

However, what we do not yet know is whether, when primed with intrinsic values, audience segments who place greater relative importance on intrinsic values will respond similarly to the participants in this study who were drawn from audience segments who place greater relative importance on extrinsic values.

It may be that particular communications and campaigns which serve to prime intrinsic values and communicate using intrinsic-frames, will be effective irrespective of the relative importance an audience places on extrinsic or intrinsic values. If this is the case, it may be that other criteria, besides values orientation, come to be seen as of primary importance for the purposes of audience segmentation exercises. For example, issues of national identity, regional language differences, educational attainment, or shared interests may provide a more relevant basis for choosing between possible intrinsic-frames to use in a particular campaign than values orientation.

Alternatively, it may be that communicators and campaigners should use different frames in communicating with audience segments that place greater relative importance on intrinsic values as opposed to extrinsic values – even though, in both instances, the frames that they deploy should be shaped to engage intrinsic values. Further work is needed here.

So while we would advocate framing communications and campaigns in terms of intrinsic values irrespective of the targeted audience segment, *it is very important to emphasise that this does not imply that we advocate a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to communication.* There will be a range of ways of framing a campaign or communication through appeal to intrinsic values. The specific frames used will doubtless need to be carefully crafted, based upon an understanding of the primary audience. There is huge opportunity here for the involvement of organizations with expertise in audience segmentation and creative communications.

Implication 5: These results probably provide insights on what frames are likely to engage intrinsic values.

We assume that the frames which participants expressed in the interviews reflect how these participants understand each of the interview topics when particular values are active in their minds. Significant differences in the frames used, varying with priming condition, can probably be taken to reveal frames that are associated with either extrinsic or intrinsic values, respectively.

Frames, however, are used not just to express what is understood, but also to understand what is expressed. This is because of the nature of communication – in order to communicate something a speaker must anticipate what a hearer is likely to understand, i.e. which common frames speaker and hearer are likely to share. In light of this, presenting these participants with the frames that they consistently use when primed with intrinsic values holds promise for engaging these values.

It seems likely, therefore, that frames which are apparent in the transcripts of interviews with participants primed with intrinsic values (especially those frames which are also found to be absent or weak in transcripts from interviews with participants primed with extrinsic values) will be of particular help in engaging intrinsic values in other comparable audiences.

We have raised the possibility of designing communications and campaigns to prompt an audience to reflect on the importance that they attach to intrinsic values. Now we can also begin to see how the results of this research point to frames which, while more passively received, may nonetheless help to engage intrinsic values.

5. Results of Phase 2

5.1. Overview

As discussed in Section 1, we had set ourselves the question: 'Can we demonstrate the possibility of engaging intrinsic values among audiences who attach relatively high importance to extrinsic values, such that the engagement of these values is recognisable when these people are subsequently asked to talk about bigger-than-self problems such as climate change or child mortality in developing countries'?

The results of Phase 1 of this study answered 'yes' to this question.

We also posed a second question, raised above in Implication 5: 'Can we begin to identify particular cognitive frames that audiences who attach relatively high importance to extrinsic values themselves use, in talking about bigger-than-self problems, when they have undergone a process to engage intrinsic values?' Although we began to address this question in Phase 1 of this study, we wanted to conduct more detailed analysis to provide a fuller picture of what frames were used by participants from the group primed with intrinsic values, but which were rarely, if ever, used by participants from the group primed with extrinsic values. Phase 2 of this study comprised this more detailed analysis – now on a subset of the interview transcripts. As discussed in Section 3.2, for this phase we chose seven participants from the group primed with intrinsic values, and seven from the group primed with extrinsic values. Our discourse analyst was no longer naive to the priming condition in this second phase. Further, we limited this second phase of the study to only fourteen participants, given the time-intensive nature of this analysis. Full details of this analysis are under preparation, for separate publication.

The discourse analyst compiled a long list of frames where, in his judgment, there were clear differences associated with priming condition – either across topics, or within particular topics. Many of these were frames that were

apparent in transcripts of interviews with the participants primed with intrinsic values, but not in those of the participants primed with extrinsic values. These frames are of particular interest because there are theoretical reasons for arguing that use of these frames is likely to engage intrinsic values among other, comparable, audience segments. Some other frames were identified in transcripts of interviews with participants primed with extrinsic values, but rarely, if ever, in participants primed with intrinsic values. These are important frames to identify because there is a strong theoretical argument for communicators and campaigners to avoid these frames, which are likely to serve to engage extrinsic values.

Table 3 summarises a subset of the frames that were identified, along with a subjective assessment of the relative frequency of these frames in the transcripts of interviews with the two groups of 7 participants.¹⁶ In the remainder of this section, we present some specific examples of text transcribed from the interviews in order to illustrate some of these differences in frames. It must be remembered that quantifying the occurrence of specific frames, though not impossible, is extremely difficult to do, so the remarks in the table are impressionistic. Nonetheless, they are based on very careful scrutiny and detailed familiarity with what the participants discussed in the transcripts.

¹⁶ At this stage, the analyst, Paul Chilton, was actually looking beyond frames. He also identified other 'cognitive strategies' reflected in language use. This included, for example, a tendency for speakers to shift their viewpoint from themselves ('I') to that of somebody else distant from them in place, time or social space. This might be indicated by use of 'we' or by invocation of hypothetical alternative 'worlds' (e.g. by using 'if').

Frames noted in the analyses	Priming condition	
	INTRINSIC	EXTRINSIC
Frames present in transcripts of interviews with intrinsically-primed participants, but weak or absent in transcripts of interviews with extrinsically-primed participants		
Moral frame	present	weakly present, fewer and different frames; less reflection
Intrinsic value of nature frame	present	not present
Equality and justice	strongly present in some participants	weakly present
Children frame: care and special consideration	present	not present
Compassion emotions/principle	present	not present
Waste-not-want-not	present	not present
Guilty conscience	present	one resistant mention
Value of human life principle	present	not present
Responsibility for others principle	present	not present
Environmentalism	present	occasional
Climate change science frames: causation, effects, cycles	Interviewees professed lack of scientific knowledge	some interviewees claim scientific authority
Helping frames	numerous generated by interview questions	not numerous; sometimes speaker counters or represses them
Poverty's not necessary: there's enough to go round	present	not present

	INTRINSIC	EXTRINSIC
Frames present in transcripts of interviews with participants primed with extrinsic values, but weak or absent in transcripts of interviews with participants primed with intrinsic values		
Doesn't affect me directly	occasional	present
Phenomenon doesn't exist (e.g. climate change) or isn't serious (e.g. child mortality in developing countries)	not present	present
Self-interest	sometimes implicit: saving money	strong and more varied: saving money, personal security
Proximity and distance framing	proximity bias countered by some	proximity bias strong
Financial and commercial frames	occasional but sometimes questioned.	strongly present
Group pressure and approval	occasional	strongly present

	INTRINSIC	EXTRINSIC
Other		
Social identity frames	present: sometimes used in favour of helping stance	present: used to dissociate self from topic
Who does 'we' refer to?	we used to mean 'we humans' as well as 'we in the UK/developed countries'	we meaning 'we humans' not noticed.
Scientism (authoritarian, exaggerated)	not noticed	authority used to ground scepticism
Mixed frames and frame switching	multiple frames; some evidence of cognitive dissonance, value conflict and change	occasional; narrower range of frames, less evidence of frame switching and adopting of other-oriented perspectives
Charity begins at home, this country first	present	'this country's economy first' version more prevalent

Table 3: Some results of further qualitative analysis on interview transcripts

It can be seen that some of the frames listed in Table 3 reoccur regardless of which of the four topics were under discussion. Others are topic specific. We would predict that such topic-specific frames will be of less general help in prompting an audience to use frames that embody the values used in the priming condition. However, this has yet to be tested.

5.2. Discussion of specific frames and their possible implications

In the following sub-sections, we examine just two examples of the key frames identified in Table 3 (themselves a subset of the total set of frames that we identified). As will be seen, this analysis is very detailed—reflecting the genuine complexities involved in the kind of ‘thinking aloud’ that occurs in this type of interactive interview.

These two examples serve to illustrate our approach to examining the ways in which frames and values appear, are modified, doubted, or mixed up in what people are actually saying. Parts of the transcript that are of particular relevance to the analysis are underlined.

5.2.1 Example 1: Moral frames

Participant 003 (intrinsic prime) reflects on child mortality in developing countries, and provides an example of how deontic words (words conveying duty or moral responsibility) raise a wider frame, here **economic justice**:

(003) umm and I think it's really unfair the injustice of
how some people have loads and other people have
absolutely nothing and yeah it's terrible

Recall that this person, in common with the other participants, was selected because of the high importance that she placed on intrinsic values relative to the population at large. But Participant 003 is among those whose intrinsic values had been engaged in her mind by means of a prime. The discourse analyst's overall impression was that participants primed with extrinsic values did not evoke this frame so clearly, or use it as often, as participants primed with intrinsic values.

For example, participant 016 (extrinsic prime) presupposes the frame of **economic justice** and **natural balance** when talking about the historical distribution of UK land, but he does not use these frames for any of the other topics, or to develop a standpoint. That is, this particular person, primed with extrinsic values does not generalize the other-oriented frame to climate change effects, the occurrence of poverty in the UK or to child mortality in developing countries. In fact, in regard to the latter, he markedly dismisses child mortality as a kind of natural occurrence and asserts “there is a moral onus on us ... *not* to provide these things [medicine and nutrition] because I believe that charity begins at home”. It seems that extrinsically-oriented frames are more strongly expressed in the participants primed with extrinsic values, and moreover that, among these participants, such frames are more likely to ‘bleed-over’ across topics.

Consider Participant 021 (intrinsic prime), reflecting on the topic child impoverishment in the UK. Here this participant makes an assertion that *x* should do *y*. In the context, such an assertion makes sense only if a moral stance based on some notion of economic fairness is understood to be in the background of her mind. Like Participant 003, this speaker uses a ‘have, have not’ formulation, which again takes it for granted that such a state of affairs is unacceptable.

(021) I think they should stop I mean bonuses and the bankers and it's publicised on the news for goodness sake, it's back to the haves and the have nots

Participant 003, at least when prompted by the interviewer, also spells out a frame concerning **moral obligation**:

(003) *Interviewer*: Ultimately, where do you think um responsibility for this problem lies?
Interviewee: ... umm with every individual in the world like to look after yourself but then to look after others how you'd like to be treated as well

...yeah I think predominantly I think it should with governments but then everybody has their own responsibility to do something and like be aware of the world that they live in but like be aware of the problems and do what they can to help.

There are several frames and values here: The overarching one is both **universalist** and **individualist**: it is individuals who have prime responsibility but, in this person's stated perspective, this responsibility is a universal one binding on each individual. The way the speaker elaborates on this is of some interest. It is clear that a focus on self does not in itself exclude an altruistic value-orientation that has universalist moral force.

At the same time, Participant 003 has a model of governance that attributes responsibility to governments (and here the speaker seems to mean governments in developed countries). It might seem that she is shifting responsibility away from self onto government. Some speakers blame the governments of developing countries in this, but this does not seem to be happening here. In fact her attitude towards governance in particular is in contrast with the kind of self-interested individualism that resists giving regulatory and other powers to government.

Compare these to frames used by participants primed for extrinsic values. Asked about child mortality in developing countries, Participant 009 (extrinsic prime) says:

009 *Interviewer* OK and lastly then how does this topic make you feel emotionally-speaking?

Interviewee er it's not something I think about that often, er to tell the truth I am more concerned with domestic issues

And Participant 010 (extrinsic prime):

010 I don't really feel much for it, you know, in a lot of ways it is ... it's a part of life over there ... it's the way of life, that's what happens so it's nothing to get too upset about.

All participants, of course, will have **compassion value frames** in their minds. That is, they know *about* compassion, even if they do not engage values of compassion in their thinking and behaviour at that moment. In the group of 7 participants primed for extrinsic values, there is one, Participant 020 (extrinsic prime), who gives clear evidence of this. She is reminded of the **'caring' frame** by the question, declares she is not caring and, as it were, holds up the frame ironically in order to discount it.¹⁷ This comes after similar unemotional responses to the preceding topics of climate change and loss of the British countryside:

020 ... I don't seem to [really] be caring about any of these things this is really bad I feel like I should "now be caring"
Interviewer: [laughs]
Interviewee: I feel like I should care but..

What seems to be happening here with this person, primed with extrinsic values, is that the 'caring' frame is available, comes to consciousness, but is then dismissed verbally. It seems possible that, had this participant undergone an intrinsic-prime, her 'thinking aloud' would have led in the opposite direction. People's openness to developing their thought and frames, on the basis of what seem to be pre-existing **moral frames**, should be given careful consideration in designing campaigns and communications. Recall that all participants were selected as attaching greater than average importance to extrinsic values. But the evidence of their discourse suggests that they are not rigidly fixed in this value-orientation. They all, *but particularly the subjects primed with intrinsic values*, seem readily able to access deontic (i.e. moral values based) discourse. It

¹⁷ She does this by intonation.

may be that extrinsically-oriented people are more likely to adopt a moral frame when primed with intrinsic values.

5.2.2 Example 2: Financial and commercial frames

Our discourse analysis suggests that the group primed with extrinsic values gives more attention to economic and financial concerns. For example, Participant 009 (extrinsic prime), when asked about climate change, responds:

009 well firstly there's the quality of life er side of things so obviously if you're breathing in polluted air then you won't necessarily live as long. Er there's the er financial reasons for it as well. I mean if we're ... mining everything to you know purely for profit and trade and everything like that eventually there'll be none left and there's the whole boom and bust scenario which can bring along depressions and such and I think those are the two biggest reasons.

This response focuses on one detail that affects human life but quickly moves to financial reasons. Although the participant does mention overexploitation of resources, this is not *per se* linked to climate change, and he focuses on financial concerns. By contrast, while financial frames are occasionally present in the group primed with intrinsic values, they do not seem to be used as extensively as a means of countering or suppressing moral frames and helping frames.

Participant 007 (extrinsic prime) foregrounds financial savings as a motive for taking individual action regarding climate change, and explicitly excludes action based on principle or obligation:

007 usage I do tend to switch things off but that's more a case of me saving money in electricity than thinking oh that's gonna help the world.
[...]

electricity use car usage and things like that most of it comes down to money for friends and family you think oh I won't do that cos it's cheaper to do it the other way.

Similarly Participant 020 (extrinsic prime):

020 all the basic stuff like turning lights off recycling uh saving water all that kind of thing but then at the same time like turning lights off and saving water and stuff also saves on my bills so it's kind of in my interest to do it as well? so if you think about it there's actually [unintelligible] like this but there's actually kind of a financial reward for you kind of saving the planet? if you look at it like that? because you save money and are kind of saving the planet at the same time

It should follow logically that financial penalty, rather than moral obligation, is likely to be anticipated to affect behaviour. And this does seem to be the case for Participant 007 (extrinsic prime):

007 Mm, what would motivate me? I suppose money if there was a financial incentive to be more proactive...

Similar frames are deployed by participants primed with extrinsic values, in talking about child mortality in developing countries. For example, Participant 007 (extrinsic prime) again:

007 ... again it's a selfish point of view isn't it. You've got to look at it. I want our Government to get our country back on its feet before they decide to plough money into helping ... developing countries.

The analysis suggests that this **saving-money frame** is different from a **'waste-not-want-not' frame** identified in the group primed with intrinsic values. The latter seems to emanate from principles that have moral force acquired from a particular social milieu/generation. Participant 021 (intrinsic prime) is notable in this respect:

021 I think that most human beings quite selfish and lazy, aaand they take for granted what they have if you were in another country you'd be more aware of, not having the wealth that you have possibly in the UK. So you wouldn't necessarily buy things and throw them away and this kind of thing, I was brought up in a poor home up the valleys and my mother wouldn't waste anything, so I guess that's been instilled in me a bit, erm I'm a little bit more free than she was because I haven't got the same level of poverty, thank God, but erm, I 'm still, you know I don't like to waste food, don't like to throw things away, don't like excess packaging, urm regarding the earth I think, mankind is destroying his own environment and er, I think there are a lot more people now that are aware of that and more conscientious about it.

It should not be forgotten that this individual, primed with intrinsic values, came to the interview as someone than with an above-average extrinsic orientation compared to the UK population. Clearly, there are specific demographic characteristics involved and, as suggested earlier, consideration needs to be given to this in designing campaign appeals.

Returning to the point that people primed with extrinsic values seem to veer toward the **saving-money frame**, we should nonetheless note that one participant in the subset of 7 participants primed with extrinsic values does take reduction of carbon footprint seriously, and this seems to have nothing to do with the sort of financial incentives that Participant 007 (extrinsic prime) invoked. Participant 010 (extrinsic prime):

010 It's ... it's quite a wide ranging thing isn't it carbon footprint. There's quite a lot you can do, you know. I am fairly conscious of switching off electric items when not in use and and, you know, keeping energy usage to a minimum and trying to keep my carbon footprint down.

Unlike Participant 007 (extrinsic prime) and others in this group of participants primed with extrinsic values, participant 010 (extrinsic prime) thinks "Definitely it's always down to the individual". But this does not seem a dominant way of thinking in this group.

Frames of money-saving and finance are often used in attempting to motivate low-carbon behaviours. Clearly, we have to be cautious in drawing firm conclusions from this small pool of data, but these results seem to suggest that an extrinsic prime increases the frequency of use of such frames. This is consistent with our suggestion elsewhere that these frames are likely to engage extrinsic values, and therefore erode wider concern about environmental and social problems.¹⁸

¹⁸ Crompton (2010); Kasser & Crompton (2011)

6. Looking ahead

This experiment has produced important results, but these are based on a small sample of interviews (in the case of Phase 2, just fourteen). While the results are largely in line with theoretical predictions, more work is clearly needed to substantiate these. Nonetheless, these results challenge universal generalizations asserted by some campaign strategists. They challenge, for example, the assertion that it is futile to address intrinsic values when targeting audiences who attach relatively higher importance to extrinsic values.

But, aside from the results we have generated, we believe that this experiment serves another important purpose. It demonstrates an approach to audience research which moves beyond the passive approach of most social marketing strategies – of simply exploring individuals' needs and expectations, without asking either: (i) what values are brought to the fore at the time of the audience segmentation exercise; or (ii) what values could communications designed as a result of this segmentation usefully strive to strengthen?

We see real opportunities here for those audience researchers who are working for organisations that are concerned to help motivate responses to bigger-than-self problems, to begin to integrate an understanding of the ways in which intrinsic values are primed across audience segments.

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